Sorry Mike, I should have said "I don't see the purpose of the
criterion," rather than "the value of.."
That's perfectly ok. Don't apologize for that. It's perfectly valid for you
not see the value of a criterion, just as it's valid for you not to see the
purpose of a criterion.
The question was a matter of
clarity, not of value.
Ken, you forgot to tell me which part of...
If no one falsifies a preference, and if a majority prefer the CW to
candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.
...isn't clear. Feel free to let me know which part of that isn't clear,
If it's about the definition of "falsify a preference", "prefer", or "vote
sincerely", I've defined all of those terms on EM. The meaning of "falsify a
preference" is obvious enough. "Vote sincerely" needs definition, but its
definition is reasonable and is what you'd expect it to be. I've posted here
a precise, abstract definition of "prefer", and also told why, for the
purpose of my criteria, it doesn't matter what "prefer" means, and in fact
it doesn't matter if "prefer" means anything.
But say so if you'd like those definitions to be posted again. Since they're
the same for all of my criteria, of course I don't post them every time I
state one of my criteria. So tell me if you want one or more of them posted
Rob Lanphier kindly clarified the criterion
in another posting (thanks Rob!),
Perhaps you mean that Rob explained to you something that is already clearly
and unambiguously expressed in the criterion's definition stated above,
something that you might not have needed explained to you if you had more
carefully considered what you were saying, before posting about it.
I see now that the SFC applies to strict majorities only.
...and the definition quoted above didn't say that? When "majority" is used
by itself, it's understood to mean more than half of the voters. But if that
was your problem, you could have said so.
I do want to discuss the issue of "sincerity" a little further
however. I had written "it doesn't matter if the reason for the votes
was honest, strategic, or if the voter's mothers told them what to
do." From your response it seems I need to clarify this statement.
If we're talking about just one profile (yes, one set of votes), then
what I said was true.
Unquestionably what you said was a true statement about your own preferences
Of course, a criterion might then validly apply
a constraint against what is strategically possible with manipulation
of the votes (creating another profile in the process that has a
defined loser or winner).
Come again?? Ken, if you're going to define a criterion, or even say
something definite about an already-defined criterion, you're going to have
to say it better than that.
If that sentence is intended to say something about SFC, I have no idea what
it's trying to say.
Perhaps you're talking on another topic. SFC is a briefly-stated criterion,
and I must admit that I prefer my wording to your wording or description
that I quoted above.
In general, it's probably better to let a criterion be defined by whoever
first defined it.
Maybe you're trying to say something about something that you think SFC
doesn't have or do. But why should my criterion do, say, or have what you'd
like it to? If you'd like something different, then I suggest that you write
your own criterion. Of course you'd have to call it something else. And, if
you write a criterion, you need to write it a lot more unambiguously than
what you wrote above.
But I don't see that in the SFC definition
Neither do I. But then I have no idea what you're looking for.
so there doesn't appear to be a reason for the sincerity constraint.
Again, you're not quite being clear with us about what you mean. If no one
falsifies, then sincere voting by the CW>Y majority guarantees that Y won't
That's the reason for the sincere-voting stipulation. It makes the guarantee
possible. In general, that's the reason for the premise conditions of
Stated another way, one man's garbage is another man's treasure, or in
this case, one man's strategically generated ballot set is another
man's honest one. If you give me a set of "strategic" ballots, I'll
give it back to you as a sincere one.
Again, it isn't entirely clear what you're talking about. If I write a
criterion failure example in which certain ballots are not sincere, as I
define the term, when compared to their voters' preferences, then nothing
prevents you from wriiting a different example in which those ballots are
sincere, because, in your example, you specify voter preferences by which
those ballots are sincere. Go for it. But so what? For a method to fail a
criterion, all that is needed is one example in which the criterion's
premise conditions are met and its requirement is not met.